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T

here is an ongoing debate about the need for standards for
improvised explosive device (IED) activities. The emergence of civilian IED response follows the development
of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in many ways. In particular,
the problems of defining contractual targets and norms were problematic in the early days of HMA, when, as for the IED response
today, money has started to change hands for services rendered.
It is the premise of this editorial that the need for humanitarian
IED (HIED) response standards derives from the contractual nature of the relationship between the client and the service provider.
Therefore, if they are to be of use, any new IED response standards
for use in the humanitarian sector must not simply rehash existing
technical military-oriented counter-IED (C-IED) procedures but
must address the problems caused by the introduction of a civilian
business model, and also take account of their relationship with
the humanitarian sphere.
Such tasks, when conducted by security forces, are managed
using what amounts to an honor system. Teams carry out work
to the best of their ability, with supervision and quality management provided through the chain of command. There are no requirements for extra, contractual stipulations as work processes
are defined by internal norms such as organizational standard
operating procedures (SOP).
However, when financial pressures are applied to services provided under contract, standard economic theory suggests that there
is an added, economic incentive to increase output at the expense
of quality. This was widely observed in the early days of HMA and
a series of process controls evolved to address this issue. Thus, the
question remains: what problems are likely to be faced in the quality management of civilian IED response, and what processes can
be used to address these problems?

Definitions and Assumptions
Firstly, it is important to take a view on the debate regarding
the definition of IED and its relationship to other terms, namely
(improvised) landmine and booby trap. For the purposes of this
editorial, it is held that these terms overlap and describe different
attributes of any particular device. The term IED refers solely to the
way an explosive device is made, and a mine is a weapon activated
by the victim. Thus, a device that is manufactured in an improvised
manner and set up to be activated by the victim is both an IED and
a mine. Similarly, given that a booby trap functions when the victim
carries out an apparently harmless act, there is considerable room
for overlap between the three terms.
Secondly, there is increasing recognition in the HMA sector that
the status of an IED is particularly relevant in determining the
technical response. The sector is discussing the use of terms like

active and legacy to describe whether or not an IED is in play or is,
in effect, an explosive remnant of war (ERW). This article uses the
following definitions:
Active device. The term active device is used to describe any IED
that is still under the effective control of the individual or group
that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant
authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.
Legacy device. The term legacy device is used to describe any
IED that is no longer under the effective control of the individual or
group that deployed them, and where the local populations and relevant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed. Any
device that does not meet the definitions of a legacy device should
be considered an active device.
Thirdly, there needs to be a common understanding of what IED
response means. C-IED is commonly held to be an overarching
range of activities, including actions to:
• Attack the network (of insurgents using IEDs).
• Reduce casualties.
• Defeat the device.
• Train the capacity.
It is the assumption of this editorial that HIED response will not
attack the network but can be involved in any (or all) of the other
elements of C-IED.
Fourthly, it is also the assumption of this editorial that HIED is
as much a subset of the HMA sector as it is a subset of C-IED. Thus,
this can be visualized as a Venn diagram (see Figure 1).
Finally, these notes are written to help understand how civilian
organizations (both commercial and NGO) can contribute to HIED
activities. One issue that has become increasingly clear in recent
months is the difference between working in a humanitarian or a security environment (as illustrated in Figure 1). This is often linked in
discussions about whether or not the IED is an active or legacy device (as described previously). While there is a link between these
questions, the terms should not be used interchangeably. Rather it is
suggested that the following distinctions should be drawn:
Legacy IED. Only humanitarian considerations are relevant.
Active IED. Both HIED and C-IED approaches are relevant, depending on the requirement.
These notes are primarily intended to consider HIED under conditions where the IED is no longer considered active or in play. There is a
brief discussion at the end of this editorial about what difference an active scenario might make to contractual standards for HIED activities.

Challenges: How Much Search is Enough?
All HIED activities—and particularly search activities—
represent a need to strike a reasonable balance between
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the main differences between
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Key: Typical examples of
activities within HMA and C-IED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Mine/area clearance
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Search
IED Disposal (IEDD)
IED Risk Education (IED RE)
Force protection
Forensics
Intelligence gathering

Attack the network

Figure 1. Interrelationship between HMA and C-IED. The rugby-ball-shaped area in the center represents the HIED response subsector. Note that
humanitarian responses tend to focus on mitigating impact, whereas C-IED activities tend to focus on attacking the network. A list of examples of
typical activities in both sectors, including in the HIED subsector, are shown in the key. These activities are discussed in more detail in the text.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

IEDs and other explosive weapons is that IEDs are (almost) always
disguised. As a result, significant effort must be spent to locate the
device before disposal action can be taken. Given the range of complexity (particularly in terms of disguise) of many modern IEDs, to
always be fully effective one might have to dismantle all buildings
brick by brick to be 100 percent certain that the building does not
contain IEDs. This is akin to destroying the village in order to save
it and is, in effect, doing the enemy’s job for them. Such a comprehensive approach to search is also very inefficient as dismantling of
a building will take a search team a very long time.
On the other hand, there is potentially a perverse incentive
for civilian HIED operators to maximize efficiency (particularly
if they are paid by the number of tasks completed or the square
meterage covered) by minimizing the effort (or effectiveness) of
search activities. Without clear, contractual requirements and
norms in place, there is a risk of ‘rush to the bottom’ quality in
civilian HIED work. A similar problem was resolved in the early
days of HMA through the development of clearance norms, resulting in, for example, the need to search 100 percent of a designated area to a specific depth in area clearance, i.e., either mine
clearance or battle area clearance (BAC). Quality assurance (QA)
and quality control (QC) procedures were developed to help ensure and check that clearance was carried out to the required extent. Similar requirements can be applied to area clearance of
victim activated IEDs (VOIED) where these have been employed
as improvised mines. However, as described previously, this is
problematic in terms of other search tasks, particularly building
tasks. It begs the question: how much search is enough?
Is it a new device, or one that was missed? Another problem encountered in the early days of HMA was when a mine was subsequently found in an area declared as clear. This often resulted in
claims of re-mining even when there was no ongoing conflict. This
is likely to be a more significant problem in civilian HIED activities
given the very real risk of continued IED use by stay-behind personnel or renewed activity by insurgents. However, as in HMA, claims
of re-mining may also be a convenient excuse for poor HIED activities. The use of formal handover processes and the retention of liability for a task site helped reduce claims of re-mining in HMA.
Identifying the difference between active and legacy tasks in what
is emerging as the humanitarian IED sector has been an early step
to help ameliorate this problem, but there is still a need to consider
how to address any stay-behind IED activities in this regard.
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What should be expected of HIED? A third problem addressed
in the development of the HMA sector was the need to clarify the
outputs (and hence outcomes) of various HMA activities. The development of the five HMA pillars (see Figure 2) was an early but
perhaps flawed attempt to do this.1 It was useful because it helped
explain that mine action was greater than mine clearance. It was
flawed because it mixed field operations with the advocacy elements of mine action, and specifically because it did not recognize
the key role played by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
teams in dealing with spot tasks involving unexploded ordnance
(UXO).
Subsequent work identified the three main field products of
the HMA sector as area clearance (minefield or BAC), mobile
EOD spot tasks, and mine risk education (MRE). 2 This clarification in turn helps identify the incommensurate values of these
actions: area clearance is something that produces cleared land
and does not necessarily reduce casualties, and EOD spot tasks
and MRE, which act to reduce casualties (either by removing hazards or modifying behavior) but do not act to clear areas of land.
These clarifications assist in the establishment of a Theory of
Change (ToC) for HMA by setting out the different outputs and
outcomes for the main HMA products.

Scoping HIED tasks
Defining core HIED response pillars. The core humanitarian
HIED pillars can be defined as follows:
1. Search involves all actions to locate, access, and confirm suspect IED, or to establish the absence of such devices. 3
2. IED Disposal (IEDD) includes all actions required to make
an IED permanently ineffective.4
3. IED risk education (IED RE) is an educational process intended to reduce casualties from IEDs through the modification of behavior. 5

A Theory of Change for HIED
A similar treatment needs to be done to establish the metrics of
HIED activities. Indeed, this can be considered the prime requirement to establish a quality management regime for HIED. A ToC for
typical HIED activities can be summarized as in Figure 3. Danish
Demining Group (DDG) is currently doing more work on the ToC
for HIED, including a linkage with the Sustainable Development

•

CLEARANCE. Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war, and marking or fencing off areas contaminated with them
EDUCATION. Risk education helps people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war, and
learn how to stay out of harm’s way
VICTIM ASSISTANCE. Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job-skills training and employment
opportunities
ADVOCACY. Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in international treaties and conventions
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements

•
•
•
•

Figure 2. The HMA Pillars.1

Goals (SDG), and it is hoped that this more detailed work can be
shared soon.
Note again the incommensurate values in these different tasks.
Search tasks, like mine clearance or BAC, do not necessarily find
IEDs, thus they cannot be considered as primarily resulting in a reduction of casualties. They do however result in the release of safe
land. Similarly, IEDD and IED RE do not result in cleared land but
can be expected to reduce casualties either by the removal of hazards or by the modification of behavior (again, this is akin to conventional EOD spot tasks and MRE in the HMA sphere).
Also note that Figure 3 does not consider area clearance of
VOIED fields. As has been made clear elsewhere, VOIED employed
as improvised mines are covered adequately by existing HMA definitions and approaches, providing the appropriate equipment and
detailed, render-safe procedures are in place.

Possible Contracting Modalities and Deliverables for
HIED Activities
There are two contracting models available to address the
problems discussed in this editorial. Firstly, there is the outputbased model, as commonly used in commercial mine clearance.
This model normally uses a firm, fixed-price bidding process to
maximize efficiency. In an output-based model, service providers would be paid for the area of land cleared, normally through a
pre-defined scope of works (including specifications of the product quality) as included in the contract. This model is attractive
for clients requiring a specific area cleared to a defined depth, but
it lacks f lexibility in case of any new requirements identified during the course of the project. It is also unsuitable for spot tasks.
Output-based models are also particularly suitable for training
or RE projects where the key deliverable is the number of training recipients. The main risk with output-based contracting for

area clearance is ensuring effectiveness, i.e., that the quality of
the output meets the desired specification, but this can be addressed with appropriate quality management processes.
The second potential contracting model for HIED activities is
the service-contract model. In a service contract, the suppliers
would be contracted to provide a capacity capable of carrying out
pre-defined types of tasks for a specified period of time. Acceptable
response times can be included in the specification. Service contracts are suited to tasks that are not easily measurable in terms
of units of output, and therefore lend themselves to more complex
spot tasks such as a building search (or IEDD). Service contracts
are flexible as it allows the client to deploy the teams when and
where desired. Such contracts thus lend themselves to maximizing
effectiveness, but there is a risk of poor efficiency if the client does
not contract for the appropriate number of teams or if the teams are
slow at responding. This can be managed through use of response
time analysis and a contracting model that allows for penalizing of
poor service provision.6 The application of these two contracting
models in HIED is summarized in Figure 4.
It should be noted that it is possible to use service contracts for
area work such as area or route searches, and this may be appropriate where a number of small or otherwise unpredictable search
tasks are expected. However, there is an increased risk in lower contractual efficiency as a result. It may even be appropriate to use both
models, where large output-based search contracts allow for economies of scale, and service-contract models are used to allow for unplanned or otherwise complex tasks.
As has been discussed previously, one of the key issues in HIED
search is that, unlike for mine clearance or BAC, it is not possible
to define the scope of a building-search task in terms of 100 percent search to a defined depth. A reputable search team commander will investigate any ground sign until they are sure that there
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HIED activity

Area or
spot

Output

Outcome

Remarks

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

1

Area (rummage)
search for cache/
hides

Area

M2 searched
Cache found

Increased productive use of
safe land

Note: clearance of VOIED fields as for
HMA minefields

2

Route search

Area

Linear m/km
searched

Increased productive use of
safe route

3

Building search

Spot

Building
searched

Safe access to building

4

IED
disposal (IEDD)

Spot

IED destroyed

• Removal of hazard
• Reduction of casualties

Includes vehicle search

5

IED risk education
(IED RE)

n/a

RE given

• Modification of behavior
• Reduction of casualties

As for MRE but taking account of ‘do no
harm’ and improvised nature of devices

Figure 3. Summary Theory of Change of HIED activities, key outputs, and outcomes.
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(f)

(a)

(b)

1

Area (rummage) search for
cache/hides
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Cache found
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service contract

(d)
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2

Route search
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searched

Output based/
service contract

Linear m/km

3

Building search

Building
searched

Service contract

Availability of search team
in working days/years

Monitored by response
time analysis

4

IED disposal (IEDD)

IED destroyed

Service contract

Availability of search team
in working days/years

Monitored by response
time analysis

5

IED risk education (IED RE)

RE given

Output based

Number of recipients

Figure 4. Possible contracting deliverables for HIED activities.

are no IEDs present, but the risk in a civilian scenario is where an
amoral service provider decides to maximize profit through either
expediting search quickly or by skimping on the training or other
costs of the teams. Thus, in any circumstance where the only contracting proviso is unit cost, reputable search teams will tend to
lose out to providers willing to provide a cheaper but potentially
ineffective service.

Quality Management Techniques Available for HIED
The establishment of a quality management (QM) framework for
HIED activities becomes easier now that the definitions of the activities are established, their inter-relationships are clear, and a ToC
for each activity is in place. Many of the QM techniques as set out
in Figure 5 may be familiar from HMA. Others may be additionally
appropriate for HIED actions, particularly for search. Figure 5 represents a summary of the various QM techniques. More work needs
to be done to adapt them to HIED in detail.

Quality in HIED Contract Design
As set out previously, the handover process developed in HMA
for area clearance is applicable to HIED area and route search.
However, contracts for building search may need to account for
finds after handover. This could involve the use of follow-up studies in the event of missed items to identify whether the search team
could have been expected to find the item if conducting drills properly. The assumption of legacy items will be key in this regard. It
may also be useful for such contracts to be able to cancel funding in
cases of poor technical performance. The details of contract design
will vary greatly with each funder, but it may make sense to include
a periodic progress and quality review for the purposes of continuing or cancelling contracts. One other point: it is clear that simply
going for the lowest price in the absence of contractual benchmarks
will not result in a HIED service that is fit for purpose.

Bonds, Indemnities, and Compensation
To indemnify is to compensate for loss or damage; to provide
security for financial reimbursement to an individual in case of a
specified loss incurred by the person.7
Given that a specific problem is how to ensure that HIED service
providers guarantee that enough effort is spent on a search, then it
might be appropriate to require some form of indemnity as compensation in the event that an item is missed and then either subsequently found or inadvertently detonated. This could be in the form
of a bid bond or through retaining part of the payments until after
the contract is completed. The retention of part of the payment to
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ensure quality is a common practice in the construction sector and
may be appropriate in HIED, particularly for search tasks.

Are the Problems Addressed?
Effectiveness, efficiency, and defining the scope of works. This

editorial helps to highlight the tension between effectiveness and efficiency in HIED activities, particularly during search actions. The
clarification of the outputs from different activities will help manage expectations. Whereas the products of area and route search,
and IEDD itself, can be treated much like their HMA equivalents
for the purposes of contracting, these discussions also highlight
that building-search tasks are going to be the most problematic
from a contractual point of view. Use of a service-contract model in
addition to a strong accreditation and quality management framework may be the best approach for funding a building-search capacity, with an added use of bonds or indemnities against items being
found after a search is complete. Price must not be the only criteria
for awarding HIED contracts or grants.
Re-mining or missed items. In IED response actions against
legacy items, it would appear theoretically clear that there should
be no instances of re-mining. Providing an appropriate risk assessment is completed by the contracting or tasking agency, work
should only be done in areas where there is limited risk of new, active items being used. However, it is realistic to recognize that a return of insurgent activity is likely in many areas where there has not
been some sort of comprehensive peace settlement. Thus, the use of
robust handover procedures will help mitigate the liability of the
service provider, who would not be liable for devices found or activated after the handover process, but strong QM procedures will
help ensure that the task site is not accepted unless there is sufficient
confidence that the work has been fit for purpose.
Implications for work on active tasks. One of the assumptions
made at the beginning of this editorial was that HIED work would
tend to focus on legacy tasks. However, this may not always be the
case every time civilian organizations are contracted for IED response work. Tasks may involve the full range of IED initiation
mechanisms, and there is also a much greater risk of re-mining.
The latter can be dealt with contractually through a rigorous application of the handover process, and through the maintenance of a
security cordon normally in place during C-IED operations to prevent re-entry by insurgents in the period between IED response activities and handover. The increased complexity of active devices
(in terms of their means of initiation) can similarly be addressed
by ensuring that the contracting process pays sufficient attention
to the need for training, equipment, and procedures for time- and
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QM technique

Description

Time frame

Remarks

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

1

Accreditation

2

Quality
Assurance (QA)
Handover
procedures
Quality Control
(QC)
Performance
analysis

3
4
5
6
7

Accident
investigations
Response time
analysis

8

KAP studies

9

Reduction in
casualties

Including assessment of training, equipment, key
personnel qualifications and SOP
Observation: adherence with scope of works
(SOW) and approved SOP
Formal acceptance of completed task by customer
from clearance agency (for route or area search)
Post clearance sampling and checks

Pre-operations

Including:
• Number of items found after search
• Damage caused during disposal
Casualties caused by missed items or other poor
procedures
Comparison of performance compared to
estimated norms, looking at number of tasks done
and any backlog of tasks
Measuring knowledge of people receiving IED RE

Post-operation

See discussion below

As necessary

Could be for injuries involving C-IED personnel
or for civilians
Measurement of efficiency

Comparison of casualty numbers over time

During operations

SOW = scope of works

Immediately at end of Establish point in time for mitigation of
task
liability
Post-operation

Periodically

Baseline and endline
studies
Time-series study to
Can also compare with figures in area where
compare effect of
program was not working (cross-sectional
intervention over time analysis)

Figure 5. Range of QM techniques available for HIED.

command-initiated devices used by insurgents in the country in
question at the time of the contract, implying a far more rigorous
accreditation process.
It should be clear that there is no contractual impediment for
non-profit organizations undertaking active tasks: the questions of
security and impartiality are questions for each organization to determine themselves, and should not be assumed or imposed externally. For DDG, the question of active and legacy is a key part of a
rigorous risk management process. Other organizations, including
commercial organizations, may have a different approach depending on their appetite for risk. They may also be willing to take on
other C-IED and force protection tasks that fall outside this editorial definition of HIED response.
Product definition. The third problem highlighted previously
was the need to understand what can be expected of HIED activities. This is a question of product definition and this editorial has
set out how the lessons learned from HMA can be used to formulate both a set of HIED pillars and also the outlines for a ToC for all
three of these main HIED components. It is important to note that
while conversations often focus on IEDD, the need to first locate
the device (through search) is a significant product in its own right.
Also, one must recognize that IED RE for local populations must
account for both the similarities and differences between landmines, UXO, and IEDs.

Recommendations
There is a widespread demand for HIED standards. Firstly, it is
recommended that any such standards need to focus on the contractual parameters, recognizing that the significant development
in HIED is the increased funding of civilian organizations to carry
out such work. Secondly, in order to develop contractual standards,
it should be recognized that the first step is to define the main activities carried out under HIED, and that in the humanitarian sphere

these include search and RE as well as IEDD. Thirdly, it is important
to adopt the appropriate contractual model to reflect the nature of
the activity. Fourthly, a range of quality management tools can be
adapted for use in HIED contracts once this process of product definition is in place.
This editorial does not pretend to address the complete requirement for HIED standards: much more work is needed to develop
such standards in detail. However, it is hoped that it has set out the
main areas of focus that will be needed if it is to be possible to effectively civilianize some IED response activities in the humanitarian sphere.

See endnotes page 66
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Endnotes
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1. An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic
materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from non-military components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally manufactured landmines
or improvised landmines .
2. The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may use the phrase
Humanitarian Mine Action.
3. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
4. Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
5. Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
6. Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
7. IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
8. IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
9. Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such assessments
will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or
whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
10. http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
11. Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
12. For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities have ceased.’
13. IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs
and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and
dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and all similar or related items
or components explosive in nature.
14. IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure
or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its construction, includes
mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.
15. See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
16. Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.
Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1. See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
2. Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the ‘field’ elements of mine action.
3. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
4. Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
5. Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
6. See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and Keeley,
2004.
7. “Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.
Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1. Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August 2017.
http://bit.ly/2weqsLy.
2. Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
3. “ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://bit.
ly/1wPPgSM.
4. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report. Bonn:
BICC, 2015.
5. Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC Working
paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.
Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]
1. Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines Advisory
Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked together
to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2 (2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French, Portuguese,
Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison, while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548 UEMS in the 100
other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was launched, include Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding from 2009 through 2015. The European
Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the World (2015):
125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
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